Abstract: This paper explores developments in the business activities of the yakuza/bôryokudan (Japan's organised crime syndicates) following the end of the Shôwa period in 1989. Since then, the yakuza have had to contend with two events which have had profound effects on their economic environment: the collapse of Japan's bubble economy right at the beginning of the new era and the introduction of the bôryokudan countermeasures law (Bôtaihô) in 1992. Whilst post-bubble economic stagnation has deprived the yakuza of many lucrative opportunities, it has compensated them with others. The Bôtaihô, by imposing new restrictions on formerly legal yakuza activities, made these sources of income more costly and thereby similarly forced gang-members to develop new sources of income. In particular, amphetamine dealing and organised theft rings have grown in response to the 'double punch' of the bubble and the Bôtaihô. The paper concludes by suggesting that the continuing economic hardship faced by the yakuza is weakening the intra-and inter-organisational mechanisms by which they have tried to stabilise their world.
Introduction
During the early years of the new imperial era two events had a massive impact on the economic, legal and political environment of Japan's underworld gangs known as
yakuza:
1 the collapse of Japan's speculative real-estate and stock-market bubbles in 1989-90 and the passage of new anti-yakuza legislation in 1991. This paper explores these changes and the effects they wrought on the yakuza over the following decade, asking what this tells us about the relationship between the authorities and yakuza.
My interest in yakuza was initially sparked during the late 1980s when, as a karate student in the northeast of Japan, I spent an extraordinary evening drinking with the prefecture's most prominent gang-leader. As a naïve student I was struck by the apparent paradox of a large and visible set of organised criminals amidst a harmonious and peaceful host community. The fascination continues. The research on which this paper is based took place ten years later in Tokyo and Osaka, supplemented with more recent material drawn largely from the monthly 'trade magazines' of the yakuza such as Jitsuwa Jidai and Jitsuwa Dokyumento 2 . I focus
Since the mid 1960s, police countermeasures had consistently been one of the two most significant factors driving the diversification of the yakuza into new business activities 3 .
As of December 1988, the yakuza comprised a total membership of 86,552 men 4 (including both fully initiated members (kôsei'in) and trainees (jun-kôsei'in) making up 3,197 groups. Of these groups, 1,397 (34,492 men) were attached to one or other of the three big national syndicates, the Yamaguchi-gumi, the Sumiyoshi-kai and the Inagawa-kai (Keisatsu Hakusho 1989: 13) . These syndicates were organised on a pyramidal, quasi-feudal, hierarchy in which the formal organisational structure was reinforced by a parallel social structure based on fictive father-son and brotherbrother links forged through ritual exchanges of sake. Within these syndicates were strings of sub-groups and sub-groups led by syndicate members of decreasing seniority.
In reaction to nationally concerted police arrests of senior gang bosses during the mid-1960s, in the early 1970s the large syndicates adopted a system of monthly tribute, (jônôkin 5 ), paid by sub-groups to their parent gang. This guarantees an income for senior bosses, while insulating them from any direct criminal involvement. In the case of the Yamaguchi-gumi, by the early 1990s the bosses directly linked to the firstlevel organisation (chokkei kumi-chô), were expected to pay ¥1.34 million per month, giving headquarters a guaranteed annual income of ¥21.26 billion (Mizoguchi 1997: 54-58) . Not all this money went to the gang boss, since leading a syndicate is an expensive business. Costs include running the headquarters; legal fees; maintenance for families of incarcerated members; and gifts of money at funerals, jail-release, succession and other yakuza ceremonies (as well as mainstream year-end and summer gifts).
Where did this money come from? Estimates of total yakuza income can never be made with any degree of confidence. In 1989 the National Police Agency (hereafter NPA) published a widely reproduced pie chart showing their assessment of annual yakuza income (Keisatsu Hakusho 1989) . According to this estimate, at the end of the Shôwa period, the yakuza collectively made ¥1.3 trillion per year.
This total was broken down as in table 1. In an interview (Tokyo, March 1998), I discussed these figures with a senior research officer at the National Research Institute for Police Science (NRIPS) who had been involved in devising the methodology underpinning this estimate. This officer suggested that significant sources of yakuza income were excluded from this estimate for political reasons: senior NPA officers considered it politically embarrassing to have to admit the extent to which criminal organisations were taking money from large and supposedly respectable businesses in exchange for nebulous services.
Perhaps the most significant source of funds of this type was Japan's construction industry. In 1990, total investment in construction in Japan stood at over ¥81 trillion (18.5% of GDP) (Asahi Shinbun 1999: 166, 81 ). If we assume that yakuza protection extends to one-third of this total 6 and that the standard rate is 3% (as suggested by interview data) then this industry yields the yakuza ¥810 billion per year. Yakuza dependence on construction is not unique to them; as Kerr (2001) so trenchantly reminds us, this industry is the drug to which politicians, bureaucrats, and vast swathes of the population are addicted.
The much-cited figure of ¥1.3 trillion should therefore be seen as a serious underestimate of total yakuza earnings. Mizoguchi Atsushi 7 (1986: 182) suggested a figure of ¥7 trillion for annual yakuza turnover for the mid-1980s, with profits being somewhere in the region of three-quarters of this.
There were two crucial (and frequently interrelated) developments in yakuza business practices over the 1980s. The first of these was their increased involvement in the speculative real-estate and stock-market bubbles. Many yakuza were initially drawn into this sphere by real-estate developers who hired yakuza to conduct jiage operations -forcing owners of small adjacent properties to sell their land and provide a large, developable site. Japanese property law provides many obstacles to doing this quickly and cheaply and the yakuza provide an expedient short cut. The commission earned on such operations was typically 3% of the land's ridiculously inflated value.
By the late 1980s, jiage was considered to be the biggest single source of income for yakuza in the Kantô and Kansai regions (Mizoguchi 1997: 66) . Ambitious yakuza moved into real-estate development, and then investment in the soaring stock market, in their own right. In their enthusiastic participation in these markets, yakuza were by no means unique.
The second key development over this period was the growth in minbô.
Minbô, more formally minji kainyû bôryoku, 'violent intervention in civil affairs.'
This comprises activities in which bôryokudan members or associates make use of the 6 As will be mentioned later, for 1990, this is a conservative assumption. 7 The one writer recommended to this researcher by yakuza and police alike. The big growth in minbō followed the 1982 reform of the commercial code, making which made sôkaiya-type racketeering harder, especially at the lower end of the business. Yakuza displaced from the sôkaiya business developed other fundraising activities. This development was significant for two reasons. Firstly, unlike the traditional 'victim-less' yakuza businesses such as gambling and protecting bars, much minbô activity directly impinges on the lives of ordinary members of the public.
The authorities' tolerance of organised crime is highly influenced by public perceptions of victimisation. Secondly, prior to 1992, minbô occupied a legal grey zone. Although it rests on the threat of violence to achieve its ends, this threat is implicit; the threatened party identifies the signs of bôryokudan membership, and their semiotic significance, displayed by the party making the threat. In most cases there is no need for the actual use of violence or its explicit threat, both of which are legally actionable.
Let us now look at how developments over the last decade have changed the yakuza world.
The Bursting of the Bubble and its Impact on Yakuza Business
The bursting of the bubble economy, with the spectacular collapse of land and stock prices, had profound implications for the yakuza. These were not purely negative; the yakuza economy is far more dynamic than that of the upper world and smart yakuza were sometimes able to exploit the economic misfortunes of others to their own advantage. Let us look at the losses and gains in turn.
Bubble Trouble
After the bubble burst, there was of course far less money floating around the economy for yakuza to siphon off. Companies that had formerly found it easier to pay yakuza to go away than confront them could no longer afford this luxury. Similarly, economic hardship reduced the amount spent in Japan's bars, restaurants and commercial sex establishments (though in international terms, the sum remains huge), reducing protection payments (mikajimeryô) to yakuza. The other yakuza staple, the construction industry, held up better due to massive investment in public works.
Yamada Hitoshi, head of the Japan Bar Association's anti-bôryokudan committee, suggests that 'probably 30% to 50% of public works projects in Japan now (1999) involve payoffs to gangs, and these vary from about 2% to 5% of the total construction cost' (Forbes 8 February 1999) . The main loss to the yakuza has been in the financial and real estate markets and it is on those that we shall concentrate here.
Following the crash, revenue from jiage dried up; investors no longer saw large profits to be made from large developments. This was a heavy blow. Moreover, many jiage-ya had diversified into speculation on their own account. Like many other investors, they had financed their speculation by borrowing, using land as collateral.
The collapse in land prices destroyed the investments, slashed the value of the collateral, and made debt-recovery a problem. Whilst this problem was not specific to the yakuza, collecting debts from such individuals presented creditors with particular problems.
In 1993, Koyama Toyosaburô, vice president of Hanwa Bank, was shot dead.
Koyama's duties had included recovering debts and it was widely assumed that his killer was a yakuza. Koyama had approved a ¥590 million loan to a yakuza frontcompany. The loan had been granted because the gang had silenced a political magazine that had been exposing various scandals associated with the bank. Mizoguchi (1998: 192) This attack prompted MOF to grant Sumitomo Bank permission to write off ¥500 billion worth of yakuza-related debts. The other major banks were also allowed to write off 'hard-to-repay' loans (ibid.). In total, by 1997, 21 major financial institutions had been allowed to write off ¥20.5 trillion of their most problematic loans (Konishi 1997: 101) .
The problem of yakuza-related bad debt became particularly acute with the collapse of the jûsen 8 which, due to their exclusion from 1990 MOF-imposed restrictions on loans to real-estate speculators and their lack of regulation, became the main source of funds to companies that failed to meet the banking industry's criteria of creditworthiness:
All seven top jûsen commonly made loans against collateral with a value lower than that of the loan itself. They made loans to borrowers whom they knew to be using false names. They loaned for speculative stock buying, for pachinko parlours … and for sex hotels. Many loans were made to companies associated with politicians.
Most of the jûsen loans made after the 1990 restriction were paid to the companies of criminal syndicates (Hartcher 1998: 128 (RCC or Seiri Kaishû Kikô) with responsibility for bank as well as jûsen nonperforming loans (Miyama 2000: 59) . It includes a special armed task force on attachment from the police to deal with yakuza related problem loans. Of the ¥8.7
9 Changes in accounting regulations introduced fiscal year 1999-2000 (requiring Japanese companies to consolidate the finances of subsidiary companies in their annual accounts) and the following financial year (in which assets must be valued at market value rather than book cost) might be expected to alleviate these problems (Economist 27 December 1999). Whilst yakuza have certainly lost money on failed investments, their ability to bully creditors into writing off their losses has limited yakuza losses. Meanwhile in other ways the yakuza have actually profited from Japan's economic problems.
Bubble Gains

Debt Collection and Loss-Cutting: Songiri
The fact that banks employed yakuza to recover debts owed by other yakuza, reminds us that debt-collection is a long-standing yakuza service. In a debt-laden economy lacking efficient legal channels for reclamation, such business booms. The standard rate charged by yakuza debt-collectors is 50%, though this may be supplemented by expenses (Yajima 1992: 22-3) . After the bubble burst, creditors could not realistically hope to reclaim the principal owed to them in full. There was therefore a new niche market for yakuza capable of exploiting the negotiating advantage that gang membership entails to act as loss-cutters (songiri-ya).
To understand how songiri-ya operate, consider the following scenario.
During the bubble, bank 'AAA' lent ¥350 million to mansion block-management company 'Z'. With the collapse in the bubble economy, Z is unable to repay the loan and the collateral falls in value to a mere fraction of the outstanding debt. Enter the songiri-ya. Having gained the appropriate powers of attorney from AAA, he persuades 'Z' to settle the debt with a payment of ¥40 million (just 11.4% of the outstanding debt, not including interest payments). The debtor pays a further ¥20 million to the songiri-ya as thanks for reducing its debt burden by so drastically. Of course the songiri-ya also receives a commission from the creditor, estimated by Hinago (1998, 166) at 3% of the amount retrieved.
This type of activity is legal: why, then, is it dominated by yakuza and their business associates? The answer is that, to be effective, it relies on the implied threat of yakuza association. The further obvious question is why creditor and debtor do not negotiate directly and cut out the middleman. Often the reason is that the debtor has some kind of connection with a yakuza group.
Auction Obstruction: Kyôbai Bôgai
This type of activity can take many forms, but effectively auction obstruction involves artificially depressing the value of a property to be sold. The ability to do this can be profitable to yakuza in three different ways: they may continue to use the property as before following the auction's collapse; they may hope to acquire the property cheaply and then sell it on at its market price; or they may be paid money to vacate the premises by those wishing to sell it.
Auction obstruction has long been a feature of the real-estate industry. In 1979, a system of sealed bids (kikan nyûsatsu) was adopted under which, it was hoped, in an attempt to prevent intimidation. However, this merely led to changes in the way in which auctions were obstructed. In particular, some auction specialists evolved into 'occupation specialists' (senyû-ya) who would strategically occupy target buildings.
There are various ways in which yakuza can take possession of a property.
They may lend money to an ailing company using short-term leaseholder's rights as collateral. Alternatively they may purchase the property with borrowed money they cannot repay and then sublet the premises to another group. Surprisingly enough, property owners themselves frequently conspire with yakuza groups by granting them short-term rights. In these cases, the objective is to deter the owner's creditors from recovering their debts. In many cases of problem real-estate-related loans, the properties in question have multiple mortgages on them. Should the property be sold, the first mortgage holder will recover nearly all of the revenue from the sale whilst the third and fourth mortgage holders receive little. These lower priority mortgage holders may therefore sell their rights to yakuza (Konishi 1997: 105-7) .
Japanese law provides strong protection to tenants, making it very slow and expensive to evict those in possession of leaseholder's rights. This makes dealing with occupation specialists difficult; frequently the most cost effective strategy may be to pay them to go away.
Once a building has been occupied, the standard practice is to advertise the fact by displaying yakuza affiliation from windows and on doorplates. Alternatively, an armoured public-announcement truck festooned with right-wing paraphernalia parked outside the property provides a clear signal to prospective purchasers. A name card, showing gang-affiliation, may be inserted in the documents giving public notification of sale. If these tactics prove insufficient, more direct intimidation remains an option, though this runs the risk of criminal prosecution.
Bankruptcy Management -Tôsan Seiri
Bankruptcy management (tôsan seiri) is one of the most sophisticated and skilled techniques by which bôryokudan members make money. When a company goes bankrupt in Japan, the legal machinery for the settlement of the various creditors'
claims usually takes several years (occasionally up to ten) and the amount of debt eventually repaid is a small percentage of that actually owed. Creditors may therefore find it advantageous to sell their debt to a specialist bankruptcy manager (tôsan seiriya) sometimes for as little as 5% of face value (Mizoguchi 1986, 189) . Emotionally fragile managers of bankrupt firms may also prefer to bring yakuza on board to protect them from the wrath of angry creditors (retired gang-boss interview 1998).
The two most important things for bankruptcy management specialists are speed of action and the accumulation of more debt than other creditors. What seiri-ya will often do is identify a company on the point of collapse and then move in with short-term financial support. From this position of strength, the seiri-ya will force the manager to write and seal a document granting power of attorney thereby gaining possession of the firm's books, seals and deeds. The seiriya may then forge promissory notes and other documents in his favour. Once the company has finally gone bankrupt, it is important to occupy the company's premises and collect any money outstanding from credit sales before any other creditors, or yakuza, can get their hands on the company's assets (Yajima 1992, 16-21) .
Following the collapse of the bubble, bankruptcies (and therefore opportunities for seiri-ya) have increased, especially when measured by total liabilities. However, since the end of the 1980s, bankruptcy management has become harder due to greater police interest in this type of activity, companies taking advantage of the Company Resuscitation Law and more stringent oversight by lawyers during bankruptcy proceedings (Yamada 1994b : 300: Mizoguchi 1998 .
As a consequence, it is now easier to attach oneself to a company before it goes bankrupt and to exploit it from the inside. An example of this is the Itoman scandal of the early 1990s in which a business brother of Takumi Masaru, the Yamaguchi-gumi's wakagashira (number two man), diverted an estimated ¥500-600 billion to the criminal economy from the Itoman Real Estate Corporation (Mizoguchi 1998: 193-6 ; Tokyo Business Today December 1994).
Complicating life for yakuza trying to develop new businesses in this changed economic environment was the introduction of the anti-yakuza law. Let us now examine this law, its causes and consequences.
3. The Bôtaihô and its Impact on Yakuza Business 11
Background to the Bôtaihô
As mentioned above, public tolerance of organised crime is largely conditional on its activities being characterised as victimless crimes. During the 1980s, such a perception became increasingly hard to maintain due to the growth in the minbô activities. In particular, cases where ordinary members of the public were victimised led to increased public antipathy towards the yakuza.
Negative public perceptions of the yakuza were reinforced by three highprofile inter-gang conflicts. The first of these was the Yama-Ichi tôsô (1984-89), the nation-wide conflict between the Yamaguchi-gumi and its breakaway faction the Ichiwa-kai, which cost 25 deaths, 70 injuries and over 500 arrests. The second conflict was the Hachiôji war of 1990 on the western outskirts of Tokyo in which the Yamaguchi-gumi mounted reprisals against the Hachiôji-based Nibiki-kai following the murder of two executives from a sub-group. This conflict was significant in that the Yamaguchi-gumi had a long-standing agreement with the Inagawa-kai not to set up gang-offices in Tokyo and the Tokyo police were particularly keen to maintain this situation. Finally, in 1990, conflict broke out in Okinawa between the Kokuryô-kai and the breakaway Okinawa Kokuryô-kai. Amongst the fatalities was a high-school student mistaken for a gang member. According to one NPA interviewee, the death of this youngster was the single most important factor in changing public opinion.
Political factors, both domestic and international, were also significant. The main significance of RICO is that it makes possible the 'single prosecution of an entire multidefendant organized crime group for all of its many and diverse criminal activities' (Giuliani 1987: 105) . In short it is 'a law that leaves the "crime" to other laws and addresses the idea of being "organised"' (Rebovich 1995: 141) . It does this by making it unlawful for an individual to participate in the activities of an organisation involved in a 'pattern of racketeering' -defined as two or more acts of racketeering within ten years. The penalties provided by RICO are severe: in addition to up to 20 years imprisonment and/or a fine of up to $25,000, RICO allows for the sequestration of assets acquired through violation of its statutes. How then does the Bôtaihô compare to this standard?
Provisions of the Bôtaihô
The Once designated, a bôryokudan becomes subject to a number of restrictions on its behaviour. Most significantly, its members are forbidden to make 'violent demands' (bôryokuteki yôkyû). These include requests made by a member of a designated group whilst exploiting the influence of that group (by, for example, mentioning the group's name or handing over a name-card indicating gangmembership). The full range of prohibited demands is covered in Article 9 of the law and corresponds roughly to the various categories of minbô identified earlier.
Should a designated bôryokudan member engage in activity infringing Article 9, the victim may notify the PSC, which will then issue an injunction forbidding the activity. PSC injunctions can also be issued without notification, against gangs pressuring juveniles to join their ranks, for instance. The Bôtaihô also empowers the PSCs to forbid the use of gang offices at times of inter-gang conflict. Even at times of peace, activity considered likely to cause anxiety to members of the public in the vicinity of gang offices (such as publicly displaying the gang's name and crest outside the office) are liable to PSC injunctions. If an injunction is violated then, and only then, are penalties are incurred. These range in severity up to one year of imprisonment, a maximum fine of one million yen or a combination of the two.
Another feature of the Bôtaihô is that it allows for the establishment of Centres for the Elimination of Bôryokudan (Bôryoku Tsuihô Undô Suishin Sentâ or, more simply, Bôtsuisen). These groups, designated at the discretion of the National PSC, have a number of responsibilities: assisting the yakuza's victims; promoting public awareness of the yakuza threat and how to deal with it; advising and helping those who wish to leave gangs; and assisting non-governmental anti-yakuza groups.
Although it is not specified in the law how these organisations should be constituted, the prefectural centres are closely wedded to their respective police forces. Offices are generally situated within the local police headquarters and many of their employees are retired police officers. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that, in part, these centres were designed to create amakudari positions for police officers.
Revisions to the Bôtaihô
Since its introduction the Bôtaihô has been revised several times. These revisions aimed to expand the scope of the law and to close gaps that the yakuza had used to evade its provisions. The most significant of these was to make the activities of yakuza 'business brothers' 13 and other associates subject to the provisions of the law.
Yakuza responses
Even before its appearance, the yakuza were taking measures to minimise the impact the Bôtaihô would have on their operations -especially the Yamaguchi-gumi (Mizoguchi 1992b: 246) . At the regular monthly meeting (teirei-kai) of March 1991, by which time the law's first draft had been published, discussion concentrated on how to respond. The following day, the executive committee sent faxes to regional block managers ordering that gang-signs be removed from all sub-group offices. Each regional block was further instructed to set up study groups to examine the law's provisions.
At the following teirei-kai, members were instructed to sever all contact with the police, not to co-operate with them and not to let them into gang-offices without a search warrant. The Yamaguchi-gumi also sought to establish better relations with the other large syndicates to minimise the risk of inter-gang conflict and the attendant legal repercussions. This diplomacy included two yakuza summit meetings (27 September 1991 and 22 February 1992) at which the participants agreed not to annoy ordinary members of the public or each other (Yamada 1994b: 406 ; Japan Access 13 January 1992; Mizoguchi 1992b: 252). However, the very varied approaches subsequently adopted by the various syndicates suggest that no common strategy was agreed at these summits.
In general the yakuza syndicates based in the Kantô region did not react as dramatically to the Bôtaihô as those from Kansai. One reason was that the eastern groups had already taken greater steps towards creating corporate facades than those in the west. Another was that the police's number one target was, and remains, the Yamaguchi-gumi. Tokyo-based gangs therefore felt less threatened by the new law.
Hence the remarks of one Tokyo-based boss that 'the new law might be a nuisance but it won't really have much effect on us yakuza, we'll just take new titles like president and manager' (Reuters News Service 2 March 1992). This differs from the widespread feeling of paranoia amongst Yamaguchi-gumi members at the same time (interviews with criminal defence lawyers, Osaka, 1998).
This difference is also reflected in yakuza courtroom tactics. Although both the Inagawa-kai and the Sumiyoshi-kai both gave evidence at pre-designation hearings, they did not dispute the decision. Tanaka Keizô, representing the Inagawakai, demonstrated this more accommodating nature stating, 'whatever the law might be, the laws decided on by the state are solemnly and humbly accepted' (Yamada 1994b: 247) .
In contrast, the Yamaguchi-gumi, the Kyoto-based Aizu Kotetsu and groups in Fukuoka and Naha launched legal challenges, arguing that the new law violated the constitutional principle of equality before the law. The Yamaguchi-gumi dropped its case after more than two years, and none of the three cases pursued to a judicial conclusion met with success.
One exception to the pattern of legal resistance in western Japan was the Sakaume-gumi, a small Osaka-based gambling group well known for its good relations with (and favoured treatment by) the authorities. At its pre-designation public hearing, the top executive representing the gang stated that 'it is the duty of the people to obey the laws decided on by the state. If the Sakaume-gumi fulfils the conditions for designation, then we have no option but to accept it' (Shûkan Jitsuwa 14 October 1999).
Post Bubble and Bôtaihô
Membership Trends
Police statistics suggest that, between 1991 and 1995, total yakuza numbers fell from 91,000 to 79,300 (13%). Unfortunately, these figures are problematic. Some groups pretended to expel members with a criminal record, thereby falling below the legal threshold for designation; those expelled retained their gang links but posed as business brothers or right-wing political/social activists. Such a decline in numbers does not therefore represent a net benefit to society. Perhaps more promisingly, in the Yamaguchi-gumi a number of gang members that were not pulling their weight were genuinely expelled (Yamada 1994b: 258) . Here the new law was a handy pretext for reducing staff in response to the post-bubble economic conditions. However, given that these were generally the least able individuals, with correspondingly low chances of legitimate employment, the social impact of this restructuring might actually be negative: these individuals are likely to continue their criminal careers but now without gang-imposed restraints on their behaviour. Although the 'double punch' of bubble and Bôtaihô has damaged the collective earnings of yakuza, this does not necessarily encourage gang-secession since the opportunities in legitimate activities are often worse. As mentioned above, the yakuza economy is consistently more dynamic and innovative than that of the upper-world. Nor does secession necessarily benefit society unless those who try it can be re-integrated into non-criminal society, which as we have seen is no easy matter.
Disbandment
Between 1991 and the end of 2000, 1,971 gangs, with a total of 16,350 kôsei'in, disbanded or disappeared. However, the overall number of kôsei'in declined by only 6,600, suggesting that many displaced yakuza were reabsorbed by other groups. As with group-secession, disbandment does not benefit society if former members are reabsorbed in other gangs, become unaffiliated criminals or reorganise as a front company, spurious social movement or political group.
Oligopolisation, Peaceful-Coexistence and Strain
Since the mid-1960s the big three syndicates have accounted for a growing proportion of total yakuza numbers. This process partly reflects increased police action against yakuza, which disproportionately affected small groups with undiversified sources of income. Aggressive syndicate expansion was quelled somewhat in the early 1990s by yakuza fears of the Bôtaihô, but some smaller groups have voluntarily joined one of the big syndicates in order to exploit their superior brand identity. Also some Kantô gangs have joined one of the Tokyo syndicates to avoid being taken over by the Yamaguchi-gumi.
As of the end of 2001, the combined strength of the big three (including junkôsei'in) stood at 58,200 or 69% of the total. The Yamaguchi-gumi alone accounted for 36,300 men or 43% (Bôryokudan Taisaku-bu 2002b) . The behaviour of these three groups is therefore of central importance to the yakuza world as a whole.
Since the early 1990s the big syndicates have made a show of attempting to reduce the level of inter-gang conflict, largely in response to the Bôtaihô's provision for compulsory gang-office closure. Police statistics show a distinct improvement in this respect; the mean annual incidence of inter gang conflicts in the decade following 1991 was 8.9, that of the preceding eight years was 28.8 (Bôryokudan Taisaku- Inagawa-kai, the two most powerful yakuza figures in Japan, also held a sakazuki ceremony. Given that Kantô-based groups already had an association promoting good inter-group relations (the Kantô Hatsuka-kai), by the late 1990s all but a small minority of yakuza gang-members were in some way tied into amicable mutual relations.
Such an arrangement might be expected to work if there were satisfactory economic opportunities for all gangsters. Unfortunately, in the 1990s, this was not true. Even in good times, much yakuza work involves protecting consumers from other yakuza. Hence yakuza alliances are bound to come under strain. The efforts to maintain peace between the Yamaguchi-gumi and the Aizu-Kotetsu were largely unsuccessful due to the continued efforts of the Nakano-kai (a large Yamaguchi-gumi sub-group) to muscle in on construction work in Kyoto. In July 1996 (just five months after the three-way sakazuki) Aizu-Kotetsu hit-men attacked Nakano, though his bodyguard foiled the attempt and kill two of the assailants.
14 By international standards, Japanese inter-gang conflicts are mild affairs. Typically they involve ritual exchanges of shots at the offices and homes of the protagonists without causing significant loss of life. Between 1991 and 1998 gang conflicts averaged 9.6 cases and 4.6 deaths per year, or 0.48 deaths per conflict. In part this reflects the lack of military quality weaponry in Japan, but perhaps more crucial is the mature, oligopolised state of organised crime in Japan; violence tends to be used more by gangs that are rapidly expanding and trying to establish their reputation.
Though this incident called into question the effectiveness of leaders'
exhortations not to cause trouble, subsequent events showed the new diplomatic spirit in action. A peaceful reconciliation was rapidly brokered and a senior Aizu-Kotetsu lieutenant offered an amputated finger by way of apology -though if the pugnacious Nakano had not been in police custody at the time, settlement would have been harder to achieve.
Yakuza harmony has also come under pressure within the Yamaguchi-gumi, peaking in 1997 when Takumi Masaru, the Yamaguchi-gumi wakagashira and financial brain, was killed by Nakano-kai gunmen. After a period of indecision, Nakano and his group were finally expelled with no hope of rehabilitation. Despite stern edicts prohibiting retaliation, attacks on the Nakano-kai continued.
The attraction of Tokyo's wealth to hungry Yamaguchi-gumi members has led to a number of running conflicts between Yamaguchi-gumi sub-groups and Tokyobased gangs, while economic hardship has severely impaired the ability of the Kantō
Hatsuka-kai to maintain harmony among the Tokyo gangs. In 2001 there was a rash of incidents amongst Hatsuka-kai members, most notably the shooting of two Sumiyoshi-kai executives by Inagawa-kai members at a gang funeral in Tokyo. In the case of a long-running internal feud at the Tokyo-based Kokusui-kai, the disputants rejected offers of mediation from fellow Hatsuka-kai members. Meanwhile, the penalties for causing trouble within the Hatsuka-kai are now less rigorously applied.
All of this suggests that economic hardship is destabilising the yakuza world. Of course these conflicts inevitably result in increased police intervention, further exacerbating business conditions.
We can see here the dilemma of large syndicates: their interests do not always coincide with those of their lower-ranking members and sub-groups. Directives to sub-groups after monthly meetings continually instruct them to refrain from antagonising other groups, dealing in drugs or getting involved with foreigners, which suggests that such directives are equally continually flouted.
Injunctions and Violations
From 1992 to 1999 the number of injunctions issued under the provisions of the Bôtaihô each year increased rapidly as victims learned how to make use of the new law. In 2000 the number of injunctions 15 issued fell for the first time (from 2,300 in 1999 to 2,280). This suggests that knowledge of this law has been fully disseminated and that barring changes in yakuza behaviour, injunctions will remain stable at around their current level.
Perhaps more interesting than the number of injunctions is the trend in injunction violations. Until 1995 only one injunction had been violated. In the following five years injunction violations numbered six, nine, eight, seven and four.
Given the number of injunctions issued, these numbers are very low, suggesting that Bôtaihô injunctions are largely effective when issued. . The vast majority of these arrests therefore amount to no more than short, admittedly unpleasant, spells in police custody.
Arrests
Perhaps the most remarkable trend in the arrest statistics over the 1990s is the widening gap between the arrest probabilities (arrests/members) for the big three syndicates versus all other gangs. These show that over the decade, members of the big three gangs became considerably more likely to experience arrests, whilst other gang members became far less likely to be arrested. Moreover this rise in the former figure was overwhelmingly due to increased arrests of Yamaguchi-gumi members.
16 Another development in lumpen-yakuza activity in the 1990s was growth in organised theft. Arrests of yakuza for theft almost doubled between 1991 and 1997, from 13,016 to 24,838, and this the police do accept is a side-effect of the Bôtaihô (Yasuda 1998: 27-8) . In particular the number of such cases involving ten or more individuals jumped from below ten in the preceding years to 60 in 1997 (Jitsuwa Jidai December 1998).
Of particular concern is the increase in violent, professional robbery, hitherto practically unheard of in modern Japan. In 1993 there were six robberies of armoured delivery cars compared to five in the preceding three years combined. and, perhaps more significantly, the bottom has fallen out of the dot.com market.
Conclusion
Over the last decade, the yakuza have had to contend with the 'double punch' of the collapse of the bubble and the introduction of the Bôtaihô. The rapid evolution of new types of business in response to this changed environment illustrates the highly fluid nature of organised crime. In the case of some businesses, such as auction obstruction, the post-bubble recession is clearly the major factor, but elsewhere the effects of the economic and legal factors are too closely entwined to be analysed separately. A harsher economic environment made it harder for companies to pay off yakuza; the Bôtaihô made it easier for them to stop. Both factors tended to push yakuza in the direction of alternative activities such as amphetamines and organised theft.
Given that the Bôtaihô has had these socially dysfunctional side effects, should we condemn it? No. The Bôtaihô has applied judicial controls to the formerly grey area of minbô, providing legal redress in cases of purely predatory 'violent demands' in which no service is provided to the victim. The growing numbers of
Bôtaihô injunctions, combined with the extremely low rate of injunction-violation, are
Bôtaihô successes, albeit within limited parameters.
However, when the victims of yakuza 'violent demands' are themselves operating outside the law, or on its margins, recourse to the Bôtaihô is not an option.
Illegal foreign workers and street prostitutes thus remain subject to yakuza predation.
Moreover, the continuing demand for the yakuza's protective services from various sectors of mainstream business make it highly unlikely that any statutory measure will put an end to yakuza interaction with the legitimate world.
As we saw from the immediate reaction of the various syndicates to the law, the threat of gang-office closure at times of inter-gang conflict has generally been an effective inducement for gangs to quickly and peacefully resolve their differences.
The two 'summits' of 1991 and the subsequent 'sakazuki diplomacy' suggests a trend for the western syndicates to adopt the less confrontational norms of the Tokyo-based groups. This, too, is a direct consequence of the Bôtaihô.
Perhaps the most significant effect of the Bôtaihô, however, has been psychological. For the first time a law has specifically identified the yakuza as a social evil. This has affected the mindsets of the police, citizens and yakuza alike. Outside the illegal vice markets, organised crime is no longer seen as inevitable. The yakuza's victims are increasingly launching civil suits against their tormentors and the prosecutors have taken a more adventurous line in indicting bosses when, for example, their bodyguards are armed.
Further pressure on the yakuza comes from three new anti-organised crime laws passed in 1999, which provide for increased use of wire-tapping and sting operations in serious crimes, increased penalties for such crimes and wider scope for seizure of assets of organised criminals. It is too early to assess the impact of these laws. However, if rigorously implemented, they will increasingly force the yakuza to conceal their activities and identity, becoming more like gangs in other countries with similarly strict provisions.
While applauding these blows against the yakuza, we should be aware of certain risks. As Schelling (1984: 172) observes, one of the advantages of a wellestablished set of organised crime groups, each with a long time horizon, is that they are likely to internalise costs that would be externalities to individual criminals. They therefore have a greater interest in not antagonising the authorities unnecessarily. We can see this illustrated most clearly in Tokyo with the Kantô Hatsuka-kai, but with the coming of the Bôtaihô the western syndicates have also increased their diplomatic efforts. However, economic hardship has left the leadership of these syndicates struggling to maintain stability and adherence to the policy of peaceful coexistence among member gangs.
At a delicate time like the present, the authorities are faced with a difficult paradox. As we have seen, their principal targets have been the Yamaguchi-gumi, and to a lesser degree the two big Tokyo-based syndicates, the Inagawa-kai and Sumiyoshi-kai. In a sense this is both natural and right, for these are the strongest centres of underworld activity in the land and account for two-thirds of the yakuza population. But at the same time these giant syndicates are also the main guarantors of stability in the yakuza world: the only organizations with the power and authority to enforce non-violence pacts. There is a danger that if they start to fragment under the impact of the Bôtaihô and the recession, we could see internecine warfare and a proliferation of breakaway groups willing to engage in the dirtiest of businesses and eager, as newcomers, to establish a reputation for willingness to use violence. This would be a severe challenge to the effectiveness of the new laws and the courage of those entrusted with enforcing them.
